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developments  in  visual  neuroscience  and  neural-network  modeling  indicate  the  existence 
of separate pathways for the processing of form and surface attributes of a visual object. in line 
with prior theoretical proposals, it is assumed that the processing of form can be explicit or con-
scious only as or after the surface property such as color is filled in. in conjunction with extant 
psychophysical findings, these developments point to interesting distinctions between noncon-
scious and conscious processing of these attributes, specifically in relation to distinguishable tem-
poral dynamics. At nonconscious levels form processing proceeds faster than surface processing, 
whereas in contrast, at conscious levels form processing proceeds slower than surface processing. 
implications of separate form and surface processing for current and future psychophysical and 
neuroscientific research, particularly that relating cortical oscillations to conjunctions of surface 
and form features, and for cognitive science and philosophy of mind and consciousness are dis-
cussed.
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IntroductIon
Metacontrast is a type of backward visual masking in which the vi-
sibility of a brief target stimulus is suppressed by a following brief mask 
stimulus that spatially is adjacent to or surrounds the target. The time 
interval between the onsets of the two stimuli is termed the stimulus 
onset asynchrony (SOA). In metacontrast, the suppression of target 
visibility depends critically on the target-mask SOA: Suppression is 
weak at very small SOAs; for instance, 0 ms, and at SOAs in excess 
of 150 ms, and strongest when SOAs range between about 20 and 
80 ms. As will become evident below the exact SOA value yielding op-
timal suppression of target visibility depends on the criterion content 
(Kahneman, 1968; see also Breitmeyer & Öğmen, 2006, Chapter 2). We 
limit ourselves to several recent findings obtained in our laboratories 
and relate them (a) to findings – some quite recent – on the cortical 
architecture underlying visual perception, and (b) to issues concern-
ing nonconscious and conscious visual information processing. Our 
recent findings, since they exploit metacontrast merely as a method 
to render stimuli more or less visible, do not constitute critical tests 
of extant theories of underlying metacontrast mechanisms, although 
any of the theories forseeably ought to accommodate them. Hence, 
although relevant to theories of visual masking, our approach allows us 
to reflect on the relation of these recent findings to current theories of 
visual consciousness. Here, instead of delving into specific mechanisms 
of metacontrast, we take it to be an effective experimental means or 
method for rendering attributes of stimuli invisible in order to probe 
the nature of nonconscious and conscious visual processing.AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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Metacontrast and crIterIon      
content
Although there are so called criterion-free methods (e.g., the multiple-
alternative forced-choice response method) for assessing psychophysi-
cal performance, in a typical perception experiment a human observer 
is instructed to respond to a stimulus according to some criterion. 
A stimulus presented to any sensory modality provides several sources 
of information. For example, when investigating the somatosensory 
system, a stimulus applied to the skin may have a certain size, tex-
ture, pressure, temperature, etc. Any of these attributes is a source of 
information that could be used to respond to the stimulus. When a 
particular source of information, by way of experimental instruction, 
becomes the basis of an observer’s responding to a stimulus, that source 
constitutes the observer’s criterion content. The psychophysical results 
obtained in a given study depend critically on the criterion content 
adopted. For example, during metacontrast one stimulus attribute of a 
visual stimulus such as its location or presence in the visual field may be 
accessible to conscious verbal report, while another such as its color or 
form may not (see Breitmeyer & Öğmen, 2006, Chapter 8). However, 
an attribute that is inaccessible to conscious report may nonetheless 
register in the visual system and be accessible nonconsciously to a 
number of behavioral and motoric response systems (Dolan, 2002; 
Esteves & Öhman, 1993; Klotz & Neumann, 1999; Milner & Goodale, 
1995, 2008; Weiskrantz, 1997). 
In a recent study, Breitmeyer et al. (2006) compared how metac-
ontrast masking affects the perception of the luminance contrast (a 
surface feature) of a target to how it affects the perception of the target’s 
shape (a form feature). The methods and results of the study are il-
lustrated in Figure 1. As shown in the upper panel of Figure 1, in one 
task, using a psychophysical tracking method, observers were asked 
to match the perceived luminance contrast of a black target’s surface 
relative to an unmasked comparison stimulus; in the second task the 
same observers were asked to identify one of three disk-like targets that 
differed in the shape delineated by their contours (a complete disk, a 
disk with an upper contour deletion as shown, and a disk with a lower 
contour deletion). Normalized visibilities of the targets for the two tasks 
are shown in the lower panel of Figure 1. Note that metacontrast, as 
expected, generally produces a decrease of the visibilities of the target’s 
surface contrast and of its form. What is moreover readily apparent 
is, first, that the SOA at which peak contour masking occurs is 10 ms, 
30 ms shorter than the SOA of 40 ms at which peak surface contrast 
masking occurs. Consistent with similar latency differences of about 
30 ms − reported by Lamme, Rodriguez-Rodriguez, and Spekreijse 
(1999) and by Scholte, Jolij, Fahrenfort, and Lamme (2008) − between 
cortical  neural  processing  of  the  boundaries  and  the  surface  of  a 
stimulus, our model simulations indicated that this SOA difference was 
due to a 30-ms faster processing of contour than of surface contrast. 
Second, as indicated by the solid green arrow in the lower panel of 
Figure 1, at the shortest SOAs ranging up to about 40 ms a dissociation 
existed between the contour and surface visibilities. All four observers 
who participated in the study, including the author, noted this disso-
ciation. In particular, as indicated by the green arrow, at the SOA of 
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Figure 1.
top panel: the spatial layout of stimuli used to study a tar-
get’s  surface  and  contour  processing  during  metacontrast. 
in  the  contrast  matching  task,  the  target  and  comparison 
stimulus were presented slightly above and symmetrically to 
the right and left of fixation, and only the target was followed 
by a mask. the observer on any trial had to indicate which 
of  the  two  stimuli,  target  or  comparison,  appeared  darker. 
in the contour discrimination task, the target and following 
mask were both centred slightly above and either to the left 
or else to the right of fixation. the target could be a disk with 
either an upper contour deletion (as shown), a similar lower 
contour deletion, or no deletion. here the stimulus display 
position and target shape was randomized over trials. Using 
a three-alternative forced-choice procedure, on any trial the 
observer had to indicate which of the targets was presented. 
Bottom panel: the normalized target visibility functions, rela-
tive to a baseline visibility of 1.0 obtained when the targets 
were  presented  without  the  following  mask,  shown  sepa-
rately for surface contrast and for contours, as a function of 
the stimulus onset asynchrony (soA) between the target and 
the mask. note (a) the difference of 30 ms between the opti-
mal masking obtained for the contour discrimination and the 
contrast matching tasks (dotted arrows) and (b) the dissocia-
tion between contour and contrast visibilities at the soA of 10 
ms (dashed arrow). Adapted from “Meta- and Paracontrast re-
veal differences Between contour and Brightness-Processing 
Mechanisms” by B. g. Breitmeyer, h. Kafaligönül, h. Öğmen, 
l. Mardon, s. todd, and r. Ziegler, 2006, Vision Research, 46,    
pp. 2646, 2647.AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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10 ms at which the form of the disk-like target was not seen or very 
difficult to see, the surface of the target appeared quite dark, matching 
about 70% of the contrast of the unmasked target. This indicates that 
at this SOA the mask strongly suppressed the processing of the target’s 
contour needed to discriminate the forms of the three disk-like targets 
while leaving largely intact the processing of its surface’s luminance 
contrast. This dissociation was reflected in the phenomenal appear-
ance of a target area that was not completely filled out from its center 
to its contours, that is, of a dark target with distorted, missing or blurry 
contours.1 
Issues In the study of conscIousness
Although metacontrast as an experimental technique is easily defin-
able, consciousness is not. Perhaps a first good attempt at an opera-
tional definition, provided by Searle (1992), is that consciousness is that 
state of an organism that is absent during, and is present after recovery 
from, deep anesthesia, or coma. As a point of departure, the following 
discussions assume that we are dealing with human observers who are 
in such a (conscious) state. Hence the focus will be on consciousness 
as a trait of cognitive contents (Stoerig, 2002). It is important to note 
that while many cognitive contents are conscious, many others are, or 
can be rendered, nonconscious. We take the conscious registration 
of stimulus information, that is, its cognitive contents, to constitute 
what  has  been  referred  to  as  primary  visual  perception, defined as 
“…our most basic subjective experiences of brightness and color that 
are sometimes referred to as ‘qualia’ [italics added]” (Pollen, 2008, 
p. 1991). Conscious registration thus refers to the subjective, phenom-
enal appearance of stimuli in the visual field. By that definition, terms 
such as subliminal perception or unconscious perception are misnomers. 
In their place we will use the term nonconscious vision or nonconscious 
visual processing. Although nonconscious vision or processing is most 
likely the only type of vision of organisms very low in the phylogenetic 
hierarchy, it can also arise in normal human observers exposed to one 
of several methods inducing transient “blindness” (Kim & Blake, 2005) 
and in a variety of neurological patients, such as those with blindsight 
(Persaud & Cowey, 2008; Weiskrantz, 1997). 
In this article, we propose that visual consciousness is, in a more 
than metaphoric sense, superficial. To support this proposal, we follow 
up on the results of Breitmeyer et al.’s (2006) study revealing a distinc-
tion between two general kinds of subjective visual experiences ac-
companying the perception of objects. A visual object is characterized 
by boundaries or contours that delimit its geometric properties such 
as size, shape, and location in visual space and by surface properties 
such as color or luminance contrast, which fill the region within the 
contours. Perceived surface properties (such as color or lightness) are 
classic examples of purely sensory qualia; whereas the perceived form 
or shape attributes of visual objects are characterized by spatial extent 
and for that reason we henceforth refer to as geometric qualia. 
The gist of the proposal is that the perception of geometric qualia, 
that is, the conscious registration of an object’s form attributes, such as 
orientation or curvature, depends necessarily on the conscious regis-
tration of sensory surface qualia, such as color. Without the superficial 
qualia there is no conscious visual apprehension of objects. 
Not all visual cognition of objects and their attributes depends 
on their being perceived. For example, in healthy observers one can 
experimentally induce transient stimulus blindness without affecting 
the processing of geometric attributes such as the shape, location or 
motion of a stimulus at a nonconscious level (Breitmeyer, Öğmen, & 
Chen, 2004; Klotz & Wolff, 1995; Neumann & Klotz, 1994; Öğmen, 
Breitmeyer,  &  Melvin,  2003;  Wiesenfelder  &  Blake,  1991).  Besides 
such instances of nonconscious vision in normal observers, several 
studies of blindsight in patients with damage to primary visual cortex 
have shown that when stimuli are presented to the affected field their 
location, motion, and wavelength can be discriminated without the 
accompanying registration of qualia (Cowey & Stoerig, 2001; Pöppel, 
Held, & Frost, 1973; Weiskrantz, 1997). Milner and Goodale (1995) 
also review a series of studies of cortically blind patients who nonethe-
less have access to geometric attributes of objects without conscious 
registration of corresponding geometric qualia. For instance, such a 
patient, while failing to report the conscious registration of objects, can 
appropriately adjust his or her grip aperture when reaching for objects 
of variable width. Hence, some visuo-cognitive functions, particularly 
those underlying the on-line control of skeletomotor actions (Milner 
& Goodale, 1995) can proceed “beneath the dashboard.” However, 
such control relies on short-lived cognitive contents that are continu-
ously updated by information derived from the dynamically changing 
human-environment interactions and hence are not tied to perceptual 
information stored in (long-term or working) memory. In contrast, ac-
cess to perceptual information is important in situations requiring the 
monitoring and resolving of conflicting interactive processes that ac-
company conscious guidance of skeletomotor action (Morsella, 2005). 
The starting point of the ideas developed in the present paper, that 
the conscious registration of surface qualia, such as the color of visual 
stimuli, is necessary for the conscious registration of the stimuli as 
visual objects is not novel (e.g., Grossberg, 2003; Lamme et al., 1999; 
Ramachandran, 1992, 2003), and it appears so obvious as to warrant no 
further explanation. It has been intuited and expressed in one form or 
another by philosophers and cognitive scientists alike. For instance, re-
garding color, the philosopher of art John Hyman (2006), in his book, 
The Objective Eye, states that “…..there is an intrinsic tie between color 
and sentience [emphasis added], as there is between smell or taste and 
sentience, which does not exist between sentience and shape [emphasis 
added]” (p. 17). And shortly thereafter he elaborates that “…[one] can-
not see the shape of a banana except by seeing its spatial boundaries, 
however fleeting and uncertain this experience may be. And [one] 
cannot see its spatial boundaries except [emphasis added] by seeing 
the differences of color that make it visibly distinct from its surround-
ings” (p. 18). Related views of the importance of surface features such 
as colors to our understanding of visual consciousness are expressed 
most explicitly by Stephen Grossberg’s (2003) claim that “surfaces are 
for seeing” (p. 19). Since standard definitions of sentience and seeing 
refer to conscious awareness, Hyman’s intuition and Grossberg’s model 
assert that our conscious awareness of shape depends on conscious AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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awareness of surface properties such as color. Below, this thesis is 
elaborated within a neurocognitive framework that is consistent with 
existing psychophysical, neuroanatomical, and network modeling ap-
proaches to visual cognition. Implications of this thesis, some of which 
are not immediately obvious, for interpretations of extant findings and 
for further research on object perception also are discussed. 
neural network approaches           
to object VIsIon
Biologically realistic models of vision (e.g., Biederman & Ju, 1988; 
Grossberg, 1994; Marr, 1982) incorporate separate processing modules 
responsible for determining the existence and location of boundaries, 
that is, the outer edges or contours, of objects and for filling in the 
surface properties within the boundaries of the object. The evolving 
versions of Grossberg’s model of visual processing (Grossberg, 1987, 
1994; Grossberg & Yazdanbakhsh, 2005) provide particularly apt illus-
trations of these processes. The model incorporates what is known as 
the Boundary Contour System (BCS) and the Feature Contour System 
(FCS). The BCS specifies the existence and location of object bounda-
ries. It delineates, for example, the two-dimensional form outline of 
an object. The FCS specifies the existence and type of surface features 
that fill in the area delimited by the BCS. When combined the per-
ceived object is rendered in terms of its form attributes (the geometric 
qualia of orientation, width, length, curvature, etc.) and of its surface 
attributes (the sensory qualia of color, lightness or gray level, etc.). Thus 
we can perceptually distinguish two photo images of, say, an Anjou 
pear and a Bartlett pear by color; of others, such a green clover leaf and 
a green dandelion leaf by shape; and of still others, such as a banana 
and a pomegranate by color and shape. A schematic depiction of the 
contributions of the form-processing BCS and the surface-processing 
FCS to object perception is illustrated in Figure 2 for two objects, a 
square and a rhombus with differing, red and green, surface colors.
An important aspect of the BCS is that its processing of form is 
implicit, that is, occurs at nonconscious levels (Grossberg, 2003), as 
indicated by the dashed lines delineating the contour outline of the ob-
jects. The interactive role of the BCS and the FCS in object perception 
has been stated as follows by Grossberg (1994):
A boundary that is completed within the segmentation system (de-
noted BCS) does not generate visible contrasts within the BCS. In 
this sense, all boundaries are invisible. Visibility is a property of the 
surface filling-in system (denoted FCS). The completed BCS bound-
ary can directly activate the object recognition system (ORS) whether 
or not it is visible within the FCS [emphasis added]. In summary, 
a boundary may be completed within the BCS, and thereby improve 
pattern recognition by the ORS, without necessarily generating a 
visible brightness or color difference with in the FCS. (p. 59)
These  model-based  properties  of  the  form-processing  and  the 
surface-processing systems resonate with a generally accepted notion 
that form or shape is processed before surface details are filled in (e.g., 
Humphreys, Cinel, Wolfe, Olson, & Klempen, 2000; Pessoa & De Weerd, 
2003) and have important implications for our understanding not only 
of object recognition (Biederman & Ju, 1988; Marr & Nishihara, 1978; 
Ullman, 1984) but also of conscious and nonconscious visual process-
ing. The gist of the present proposal is that the form-processing system, 
which extracts edge information, provides for the “deep” structure of 
visual consciousness while the surface-processing systems provides for 
its “surface” structure. The implications will be more fully explored af-
ter a description of the underlying neurobiological properties of vision 
that relate to the existence of and distinctions between the form- and 
surface-processing systems.
Neurobiological substrate            
for form-processing and surface-
processing systems in primate 
cortex
Almost two and a half decades ago Livingstone and Hubel (1987, 1988) 
proposed separate cortical channels for the processing of form, color, 
movement, and depth of visual stimuli. According to this proposal, 
form and color are processed in the cortical parvocellular (P) path-
ways while depth and movement are processed by the cortical mag-
nocellular (M) pathways. Along with the sharp distinction between 
M- and P-pathway, the strict subdivision of the cortical P-pathway into 
separate cortical P channels for color and for form, arising from the 
anatomically distinct blob and interblob areas in primary visual cor-
tex (V1), respectively, is controversial (see e.g., DeYoe & Van Essen, 
1988;  Gegenfurtner,  2003;  Kiper,  2003;  Sincich  &  Horton,  2005b; 
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depictions of two original stimulus objects (top panel), the im-
plicit representation of their contours by the Boundary contour 
system (Bcs, middle panel), and their explicit representation 
via filling in of surface color/contrast by the Feature contour 
system (Fcs, bottom panel).AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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cf.  Figure  3).  A  significant  number  of  orientation-selective  form-
processing neurons are also selective for wavelength (Friedman, Zhou, 
&  von  der  Heydt,  2003;  Gegenfurtner,  2003;  Johnson,  Hawken,  & 
Shapley, 2001; Leventhal, Thompson, Liu, Zhou, & Ault, 1995; Thorell, 
De Valois, & Albrecht, 1984). Consequently there is no strict segrega-
tion of cortical form and color processing systems. As noted below, 
this lack of strict segregation turns out to be a useful property for 
the processing of visual stimuli. Nonetheless, accumulating evidence 
indicates that there are anatomically identifiable pathways and areas 
in the early and intermediate cortical object-processing systems that 
process primarily the surface properties of color and luminance on 
the one hand and the form properties of contour and edge orienta-
tion on the other (Conway, Moeller, & Tsao, 2007; Felleman, Xiao, & 
McClendon, 1997; Kinoshita & Komatsu, 2001; Lu & Roe, 2008; Roe 
& Ts’o, 1999; Sincich & Horton, 2005a; Wang, Xiao, & Felleman, 2007; 
Xiao, Casti, Xiao, & Kaplan, 2007; Xiao & Felleman, 2004; Xiao, Wang, 
& Felleman, 2003; Xiao, Zych, & Felleman, 1999). For instance, based 
on Felleman et al.’s (1997) work, cortical visual area 4 (V4), like visual 
areas 1 and 2 (V1 and V2), has separate neural compartments for shape 
and surface processing. Supporting this scheme, Girard, Lomber, and 
Bullier (2002) showed that reversible deactivation of V4 in macaque 
monkey can impair shape discrimination while leaving hue discrimi-
nation intact.  
In line with proposals also suggested by others (Kiper, 2003; Roe & 
Ts’o, 1999), neurons tuned to color and orientation may be especially 
well suited for processing contours defined by wavelength differences. 
These would be especially important when the wavelength differences 
are at or near isoluminance. Thus, at isoluminance such neurons would 
contribute to the form-processing system. Non-oriented wavelength-
specific neurons would instead contribute to the surface-processing 
system. Of course, luminance-defined borders and achromatic surface 
properties are also processed by the separate cortical form- and surface-
processing systems. In a prior study of cortical chromatic processing, 
Xiao et al. (2003) showed that the thin stripes in V2, which receive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Figure 3.
schematic of the Boundary contour system (Bcs) and the Feature contour system (Fcs) in relation to two major, parvocellular (P) 
and magnocellular (M), visual pathways and their major projections, beginning respectively with retinal β and α cell, projecting via 
the lateral geniculate P and M layers to the primary visual cortex (v1). After v1 the M-pathway comprises the major, but not exclusive, 
dorsal projections to the parietal cortex; and similarly the P-pathway comprises the major, but not exclusive, ventral projections to 
the inferotemporal cortex. the dorsal projection is considered to comprise the “where” or the “vision-for-action” pathway; the ventral 
projection, the “what” or the “vision-for-perception” pathway.  note that in the ventral pathway, the Fcs (outlined in red dashed lines) 
consists of the cortical P-pathway comprising the v1-blob / v2 (the secondary visual cortex)-thin stripe projections and beyond; the 
Bcs (outlined in blue dashed lines) consists of the cortical P-pathway comprising the v1-interblob / v2-interstripe projections and 
beyond.  the Fcs processes only the wavelength and luminance properties (designated by the         symbol and the               symbol) 
of an object’s surfaces.  the Bcs processes the object’s contours (designated by the symbol) defined either by isoluminant wavelength 
differences (designated by the                symbol) or by luminance differences (designated by the         symbol). the  dorsal  pathway 
consists of the v1- layer 4B / v2-thick stripe projections and beyond. see text for further details. in all parts of the figure, the                
symbol designates ability to process motion direction, and the             symbol designates ability to process binocular disparities. 
Adapted from “concurrent Processing streams in Monkey visual cortex” by e. A. deyoe and d. c. van essen, 1988, Trends in Neurosci-
ence, 11, p. 223.
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input from V1’s color-selective blob areas, contain functional color-
specific subregions in which variations of stimulus color are system-
atically mapped onto varying locations within the subregions. Recent 
findings reported by Xiao et al. (2007) indicate that cortical color maps 
exist as early as in the V1 blob areas. These could provide input to the 
spatially more extensive V2 thin-stripe color maps (Xiao et al., 2007). 
Wang et al. (2007) additionally found that adjacent to the color maps 
within the V2 thin stripes are neurons responding differentially to 
positive (light-on-dark) and negative (dark-on-light) luminance con-
trast. We propose, following Wang et al. (2007), that the thin stripes 
of V2 receive input from V1 blob areas and comprise neural modules 
for processing chromatic and achromatic surface properties of visual 
stimuli; whereas, neurons found in the adjacent V2 interstripes re-
spond selectively to contour or edge orientation of stimuli and receive 
input from V1 inter-blob areas (see Figure 9 of Wang et al., 2007). 
Evidence for separate                  
but interactive form-processing 
and surface-processing systems   
in human vision
Studies of neurological patients with specific impairments of visual 
perception reveal that the shape and surface properties of visual ob-
jects may be processed by dissociable cortical systems in humans as 
well as in primates. A number of studies (Barbur, Harlow, & Plant, 
1994; Heywood, Cowey, & Newcombe, 1991; Kentridge, Heywood, 
&  Cowey,  2004)  have  shown  that  despite  loss  of  phenomenal  hue 
perception of surfaces achromatopsic (cortically color-blind) patients 
can detect isoluminant chromatic edges or contours. Moreover, an 
achromatopsic patient investigated by Heywood, Wilson, and Cowey 
(1987), while grossly impaired in discriminating isoluminant hues, 
was able to discriminate different achromatic grays. This is consistent 
with Wang et al.’s (2007) findings in monkey indicating the existence of 
separate luminance and color processing within V2 thin-stripe surface-
processing modules. In addition, recalling that selective loss of shape 
discrimination with intact hue discrimination was reported by Girard 
et al. (2002) when V4 was reversibly deactivated in macaque monkey, 
Zeki, Aglioti, McKeefry, and Berlucchi (1999) similarly showed that 
a patient, though all but form blind, was able to name objects’ colors. 
Moreover, even normal humans can perceive formless color, as shown 
by chromatic Ganzfeld stimulation (Cohen, 1958; Gur, 1989; Hochberg, 
Triebel, & Seaman, 1951). A chromatic Ganzfeld initially appears as a 
formless colored fog, which after several minutes of adaptation loses 
its phenomenal hue and appears as a neutral grey (Eigengrau). Like 
the results of neurological patients discussed above, in normal observ-
ers the original colored Ganzfeld percept and, after adaptation, its 
achromatic grey appearance are consistent with Felleman et al.’s (1997) 
and Wang et al.’s (2007) findings in monkey indicating the existence of 
separate color and luminance (grey-level) surface-processing modules. 
The combined studies of neurological patients and of normal observers 
in Ganzfeld stimulation thus indicate that in human vision, like in that 
of primates, form- and surface-processing systems can be separated 
from each other. 
Grossberg’s LAMINART model (Cao & Grossberg, 2005; Grossberg 
& Swaminathan, 2004), extends the BCS and the FCS components of 
his FACADE model (Grossberg, 1994) by more fully elaborating their 
contribution to three-dimensional vision. The LAMINART model al-
lows for descriptions not only of the form and surface properties of 
planar, two-dimensional objects but also of volumetric, three-dimen-
sional objects with curved surfaces (two-dimensional manifolds). In 
order to construct a veridical object representation, the BCS and FCS 
must be able to communicate or interact appropriately with each other. 
Disturbances in these systems or in their interaction should therefore 
lead to distorted perceptions of object properties. Such perceptual dis-
tortions are demonstrated by some neurological patients whose con-
tour-forming and surface filling-in interactive processes appear to be 
disturbed. In his review of deficits of color perception in neurological 
patients, Critchley (1965) reports cases in which the color of an object 
irradiates outward beyond its boundaries, sometimes at great distances 
from the boundaries of the object, and in which the boundaries of the 
object are often reported as fuzzy or blurred. In other cases the color 
of an object is perceived as not adhering to its surface, but instead as 
free-floating in space, in a plane distinct from that of the object and 
usually phenomenally located somewhere between the object and the 
patient. Related phenomena have been reported recently in a study of 
interocular continuous flash suppression (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005) in 
normal observers conducted by Hong and Blake (2009). In this study 
rapidly changing achromatic (grey) Mondrian patterns were flashed to 
one eye while a stationary chromatic bar was presented to the other eye. 
Although observers failed to see the shape or form of the bar, they did 
report the color in a free-floating, cloudlike constellation. Both cases, 
the neurological symptoms and the experimental phenomena indicate 
that the form-processing BCS either does not construct or provide 
the necessary two- and three-dimensional spatial constraints for the 
filling-in process of the color-FCS system or that such constraints are 
not communicated to the FCS system. Consequently the object lacks 
proper color boundaries not only in the frontoparallel plane but also 
in depth.
the spatIoteMporal dynaMIcs         
of forM and surface processIng       
I. nonconscIous leVel
Although modified in a crucial way in the subsequent section, the 
discussion  of  the  spatiotemporal  dynamics  of  form  and  surface 
processing here takes as a starting point the generally agreed upon 
claim that the processing of form precedes the processing of surface 
features. As noted by Grossberg (1994, 2003) the processing of surface 
features (such as colors or luminance contrast) requires computations 
that compensate for variable intensities and wavelength compositions 
of the illuminant. Such discounting of the illuminant is necessary for 
yielding the two perceptual invariances realized in lightness and color 
constancy (Zeki, 1983a, 1983b; Zeki & Marini, 1998). Computations 
such as these may be more time consuming than those used to detect 
and bind contour features needed to establish an object’s form repre-AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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sentation. Thus before surface features can render a stimulus visible by 
filling in its surfaces both its boundaries and its surface properties must 
be processed at a nonconscious levels. 
It is known that without an intact primary visual cortex, V1, there 
are few if any qualia-rich contents of visual consciousness (Breitmeyer 
& Stoerig, 2006; Stoerig, 1996). Although V1 neural activity is neces-
sary for conscious vision, there are cogent theoretical and empirical 
reasons for believing that it is not sufficient (Crick & Koch, 1995, 
2003; Koch, 2004; Scheinberg & Logothetis, 1997). In particular, if, as 
Grossberg’s (2003) model posits, surfaces are for seeing and the FCS 
fills in the area bounded by the contours specified by the BCS only 
after the FCS has established lightness and color constancy, then the 
neural correlates of conscious vision must occur at or after the stage 
at which these constancy computations are completed. Although the 
existence of double-opponent (chromatically and spatially opponent) 
mechanisms in V1 provide the beginning stages of such computa-
tions (Gegenfurtner, 2003), the computations are not complete until 
at least the level of extrastriate area V4 (Heywood, Gadotti, & Cowey, 
1992; Komatsu, Ideura, Kaji, & Yamane, 1992; Walsh, Carden, Butler, 
& Kulikowski, 1993; Zeki, 1983a, 1983b; Zeki et al., 1999). Hence, 
without further processing, neural activity in V1 cannot qualify as 
the sufficient neural basis of conscious object vision (Crick & Koch, 
1995). Such activity can be defined as stimulus-dependent in so far as 
it can be elicited by the mere physical presence of a stimulus despite 
its not being perceived; whereas at higher levels in the ventral object-
recognition pathway, percept-dependent neural activity tends to be 
elicited only when the stimulus is perceived (Scheinberg & Logothetis, 
1997). In support of such a distinction between stimulus-dependent 
and  percept-dependent  activities,  brain  imaging  studies  of  human 
observers indicate that conscious report of stimuli fails to occur with-
out sufficient activation of higher levels of cortical processing (Beck, 
Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 2001; Dehaene et al., 2001; Lumer, Friston, & 
Rees, 1998). Activity at these higher levels may play a crucial role in 
conscious vision by reentering lower levels via top-down projections 
(Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002; Posner, 1994)
Given that contour and surface properties are processed at early, 
nonconscious levels such as V1, what is the evidence indicating that 
the processing of contour precedes the processing of surface properties 
at these levels? First, as noted electrophysiological recordings from V1 
neurons in macaque (Lamme et al., 1999; Lee, Mumford, & Schiller, 
1995) reveal separate processing of contour and surface properties of 
stimuli,  with  neural  responses  corresponding  to  surface  properties 
lagging those corresponding to contour properties by about 30 ms 
(Lamme et al., 1999; see also Roelfsema, Lamme, Spekreijse, & Bosch, 
2002). Related cortically evoked potential and psychophysical studies 
of  human  observers  indicate  slower  surface  than  contour  process-
ing (Broder & Debruille, 2003; Caputo, Romani, Callieco, Gaspari, 
&  Cosi,  1999;  Romani,  Caputo,  Callieco,  Schintone,  &  Cosi,  1999; 
Veser, O’Shea, Schröger, Trujillo-Barreto, & Roeber, 2008) and lower 
temporal resolution of surface than of contour processing (Rogers-
Ramachandran & Ramachandran, 1998). Also consistent with slower 
processing of surface relative to contour properties are results of several 
psychophysical studies (Arrington, 1994; Breitmeyer et al., 2006; Elder 
& Zucker, 1998; Rossi & Paradiso, 2003). 
Here  the  recent  recovery  of  target  visibility  from  metacontrast 
masking reported by Öğmen, Breitmeyer, Todd, and Mardon (2006) 
and the previously mentioned study by Breitmeyer et al. (2006) are 
additionally informative. One of the findings of the former study was 
that a primary mask(M1) can suppress the visibility of a target (T) even 
when M1’s visibility is itself suppressed by an aftercoming second mask 
(M2). Consequently, the neural mechanisms responsible for the meta-
contrast suppression (of T by M1) exert their effect at a nonconscious 
level of processing. The results of the latter study, which are illustrated 
in Figure 1, showed, as noted, that a metacontrast mask suppresses the 
contours of the target about 30 ms earlier than it suppresses surface 
contrast. Since the metacontrast suppression mechanism operates at a 
nonconscious level of processing (Öğmen et al., 2006), it follows that at 
this processing level, the contours of the metacontrast-suppressed target 
were processed about 30 ms faster than its surface contrast.  
the spatIoteMporal dynaMIcs         
of forM and surface processIng     
II. conscIous leVel 
A reversal of temporal order
The temporal priority of the processing of contour relative to surface 
at nonconscious cortical levels reverses as indicated by recent find-
ings that abrupt changes of a stimulus’s color are perceived only about 
40 ms earlier (Zeki & Bartels, 1998) or at best nearly simultaneously 
with (Viviani & Aymoz, 2001) the abrupt changes of its form. In a 
related study of interocular continuous flash suppression (Tsuchiya & 
Koch, 2005), Hong and Blake (2009) found that the color of a chro-
matic bar presented to the (temporarily) suppressed eye nearly always 
emerged  into  dominance  (consciousness)  before  the  orientation 
(form) of the bar was perceived. Rather than revealing a contradic-
tion or inconsistency, we take these results to actually point out a key 
feature of the transition from nonconscious, pre-perceptual phase to a 
conscious, perceptual phase of form processing. According to the hy-
pothesis articulated above that the conscious percept of form requires 
the conscious percept of a filled in surface, it follows that the form is 
perceived only after (or as) the filling in of its surface features such as 
color commences. For this reason the temporal dynamics of surface 
and contour processing, though characterized by a clear lag of surface 
processing at the nonconscious level, is characterized by a lead (or near 
synchrony) of surface processing at the conscious level. 
A proposed relation between 
surface processing and conscious 
processing in vision
Recent  empirical  and  theoretical  work  (Bullier,  2001;  Hochstein & 
Ahissar,  2002;  Lamme,  2006;  Lamme  &  Roelfsema,  2000;  Supèr, 
Spekreijse,  &  Lamme,  2001),  supports  the  strong  hypothesis  that 
cortical  feedforward  and  reentrant  feedback  activities  provide  a AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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neural distinction between nonconscious and conscious processing, 
respectively. Similar proposals have recently been made in relation to 
backward masking by Breitmeyer (2007) and VanRullen (2007) and are 
consistent with Grossberg’s (1994, 2003) and Rees’s (2008) assertion 
that much of the cortical object recognition system can be activated at 
nonconscious levels of visual processing. What we make explicit here 
is that such processing occurs in the cortical feedforward sweep of 
activity. Indeed, Fahrenfort, Scholte, and Lamme (2007) and Boehler, 
Schoenfeld, Heinze, and Hopf (2008) recently showed that in humans 
the suppression of visibility of a target by an aftercoming mask corre-
lates not with reduction of early feedforward activation in visual cortex 
but rather with reduction of the later reentrant activation.
Along  with  Lamme  (2006)  we  propose  that  cortical  reentrant 
activation most strongly correlates with conscious vision. But in light 
of the above discussions, we additionally emphasize that since surface 
completion is the sine qua non of the conscious registration of visual 
stimuli, the same cortical reentrant activation that correlates with con-
scious registration of visual stimuli must also correlate with cortical 
surface completion processes. Thus, the form features of a visual stimu-
lus that are processed nonconsciously (Breitmeyer, 2007; VanRullen, 
2007) become conscious geometric qualia of visual objects only as or 
after the surface features/qualia are filled in. 
IMplIcatIons for research                   
In VIsual cognItIon, neuroscIence, 
and cognItIVe scIence
Like other theoretical approaches (e.g., Grossberg, 1994, 2003; Rossi 
& Paradiso, 2003) the present approach posits (a) earlier processing 
of  form  than  of  surface  properties,  however  only  at  nonconscious 
levels.  Specifically  like  Grossberg’s  (1994,  2003)  approach,  it  posits 
(b) that the “surface structures” of visual consciousness, that is, its 
sensory qualia, constitute prerequisites for access to the “deep struc-
tures”, that is, the formal geometric qualia, of visual consciousness. 
From (b) it moreover follows (c) that a perception of surface proper-
ties precedes (or is nearly simultaneous with) the perception of form 
at conscious levels. These aspects of the approach, as noted above, are 
consistent with a number of neurophysiological and psychophysical 
results. 
Brain imaging studies
The  approach  taken  here  claims  that  the  conscious  registration  of 
visual geometric qualia depends on the conscious co-registration of 
sensory surface qualia. Without the latter there is no conscious vision 
of objects. This, as we noted above, has strong implications for theories 
of visual consciousness and for research strategies directed at finding 
the neural correlates of conscious vision. Specifically, in future brain 
recording and brain imaging research on neural correlates of conscious 
vision in humans, it would be particularly fruitful to examine activi-
ties in those areas of visual cortex that process surface features such as 
luminance contrast and color. Recent functional magnetic resonance 
imaging  (fMRI)  using  strong  magnetic  fields  promise  surprisingly 
good spatial resolution of specific cortically evoked activities (Sun et 
al., 2007). With such high resolution magnets it may, for example, be 
possible to look for fMRI correlates of surface processing in human 
extrastriate areas that are homologues or analogues of cortical regions 
such as those reported by Conway et al. (2007) and by Felleman and 
colleagues (Felleman et al., 1997; Xioa & Felleman, 2004; Xiao et al., 
1999, 2003; Wang et al., 2007). Moreover, it would also be informative 
to investigate how form-processing and surface-processing regions of 
cortex interact. If, as Bar and Biederman (1999) have proposed, visual 
awareness of object identity is associated with activity at or beyond the 
anterior region (area TE) of inferotemporal (IT) cortex, one would ex-
pect the surface filling-out processes also to be completed at or beyond 
that level. 
Additionally informative would be the study of how higher-level 
cortical activities associated with conscious report of visual stimuli, 
such  as  the  dorsal  prefrontal  and  parietal  areas  (Beck  et  al.,  2001; 
Dehaene et al., 2001; Lumer et al., 1998), are functionally connected 
with  the  surface-processing  and  form-processing  regions.  A  useful 
approach  to  investigating  the  roles  of  these  higher-level  processes 
would be to exploit the misbinding of orientation and color attributes 
known to occur during binocular rivalry in normal observers (Hong & 
Shevell, 2006; Shevell, St.Clair, & Hong, 2008). For example, if a verti-
cal grating composed of alternate orange and grey bars is presented to 
one eye and a horizontal grating composed of alternate blue and grey 
bars is presented to the other eye, observers might report either eye-
specific rivalry in which the former or the latter grating alternate their 
respective periods of perceptual dominance and suppression. Here, 
contour orientation and color are perceptually correctly bound (or 
not misbound). However, observers often also report seeing a (vertical 
or else a horizontal) grating composed of alternate orange and blue 
bars. Here color and contour orientations are perceptually misbound. 
Studies  using  electro-/magneto-encephalographic  and  fMRI  brain 
imaging techniques may provide useful information as to the cortical 
connectivity patterns underlying such rivalry-induced misbindings of 
color and orientation information.
Temporal order                                 
and micro-consciousnesses?
On the basis of asynchronies in the perceptual registration of stimulus 
attributes such as form, color and motion, Zeki (see e.g., Moutoussis 
&  Zeki,  1997;  Zeki,  2005;  Zeki  &  Bartels,  1998) has proposed the 
existence of separate modular micro-consciousnesses, one for each 
stimulus attribute. In contrast to this proposal, the present approach 
instead argues that there cannot be a consciousness of form separate 
from that of surface properties such as color. This assertion does not 
exclude the possibility of the misbinding of chromatic or achromatic 
surface features and form features that were noted above (Friedman-
Hill, Robertson, & Treisman, 1997; Hong & Shevell, 2006; Humphreys 
et al., 2000; Humphreys & Riddoch, 1994; Robertson, 2003; Shevell et 
al., 2008). Even when, say, a color and form are misbound and yield an 
illusory conjunction, the claim being made is that in these cases there 
will be no conscious percept of the form without a prior filling in of the AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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wrong or inappropriate color information. On the other hand as also 
noted above, conscious spatially diffuse registration of color can exist 
separately from, that is, without, conscious registration of form (Hong 
& Blake, 2009).
Feature integration and object 
recognition
Neurophysiologically  plausible  models  of  visual  object  recognition 
assume  that  the  earliest  cortical  form-selective  representation  of  a 
visual object is in terms of line or edge orientation (Biederman, 1987; 
Hummel & Biederman, 1992; Marr, 1982; Treisman, 1988; Ullman, 
1996).  Conjunctions  of  these  or  other  feature  primitives  like  cur-
vature, size, color and contrast are assumed to occur at subsequent 
processing  levels  (Biederman,  1987;  Hummel  &  Biederman,  1992; 
Treisman, 1988). These models are consistent with evidence showing 
that later stages of the ventral cortical processing stream are selec-
tive for patterns of input that consist of progressively more complex 
conjunctions of simple features (Desimone, Albright, Gross, & Bruce, 
1984; Hubel, 1988; Pasupathy & Connor, 2002; Tanaka, Saito, Fukuda, 
&  Moriya,  1991;  Tsunoda,  Yamane,  Nishizaki,  &  Tanifuji,  2001). 
Above  we  noted  that  one  can  experimentally  induce  transient 
stimulus blindness without affecting the processing of geometric qualia 
such as the form, location, or motion of a stimulus at a nonconscious 
level  (Breitmeyer,  Öğmen,  Ramon,  &  Chen,  2005;  Klotz  &  Wolff, 
1995; Öğmen et al., 2003; Neumann & Klotz, 1994; Wiesenfelder & 
Blake, 1991). Regarding form, Breitmeyer et al. (2005) used a masked 
priming paradigm in which a square- or a rhombus-shaped target 
served as the prime stimulus and an aftercoming and larger square- or 
rhombus-shaped metacontrast mask served as the probe stimulus. As 
shown in the upper panel of Figure 4, primes could be a whole square 
or rhombus or else consist of their parts, with the parts being either 
corners or else oriented sides. Probes were always a whole square 
or rhombus. Observers were required to respond as quickly and ac-
curately as possible, by depressing one of two pre-designated keys, 
as to which probe was presented. Priming effects were defined as the 
difference between probe-reaction times obtained in the slower, incon-
gruent (e.g., prime a square, probe a rhombus) and those obtained in 
the faster, congruent (e.g., prime a square, probe a square) conditions. 
The results of one experimental condition, shown in the lower panel 
of Figure 4, revealed that priming effects of the masked (invisible) tar-
get on choice reaction time to the (visible) probe/mask was strongest 
when whole targets served as primes, intermediate when the partial 
prime consisted of only its corners, and absent when the partial prime 
consisted of only its oriented line elements without corners. These re-
sults suggest that the nonconscious priming effect occurred at as late a 
level of processing at which conjunctions of simple form features, such 
as the conjunctions of oriented line elements comprising corners or 
conjunctions comprising holistic forms have been formed. This in-
dicates that primitive form elements such as oriented lines or edges 
can be conjoined – such conjunctions resulting in, for example, cor-
ners and vertices, or indeed whole forms – at a nonconscious level of 
processing. 
Figure 4.
Upper panel: A schematic of several possible target stimuli 
followed,  at  an  optimal  masking  soA  (the  stimulus  onset 
asynchrony) of 53 ms, by a surrounding metacontrast mask. 
the  masked  targets  served  as  primes;  the  visible  mask,  as 
probe. the targets could either be presented in their entirety 
(whole), with only their vertices (corners), or only their side 
orientations  (sides).  Form  features  of  the  target  could  ei-
ther  be  congruent  or  incongruent  with  those  of  the  mask. 
the  task  of  the  observers  was  to  respond  as  quick-
ly  and  accurately  as  possible  to  the  form  of  the 
mask,  which  could  either  be  a  square  or  a  rhombus. 
Bottom  panel:  Priming  effects  for  each  of  the  three  types 
of  targets,  obtained  by  subtracting  the  choice  reaction 
time (rt) to the mask when the target and mask had con-
gruent  form  features  from  the  rt  obtained  when  they 
had  incongruent  form  features.  Adapted  from  “Uncon-
scious and conscious Priming by Forms and their Parts” by 
B. g. Breitmeyer, h. Öğmen, J. ramon, and J. chen, 2005, Visual 
Cognition, 12, pp. 722, 727.
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oVerVIew
The  fundamental  ideas  discussed  in  this  paper  are  that  the  visual 
processing of an object is partitioned along parallel channels into the 
processing of its location, its surface properties, and its form or con-
tour properties. At cortical levels, an object’s location can be processed 
by the dorsal M-dominated pathway. Its form/contour properties are 
processed by the ventral P-dominated interblob/interstripe pathway, 
its surface properties are processed by the ventral P-dominated blob/
thin-stripe pathway. At nonconscious levels the processing of form/
contour properties precedes the processing of surface properties by 
several tens of milliseconds. However, if, as proposed, object vision 
ultimately depends on the filling in of surface properties, at conscious 
levels the asynchrony disappears or is reversed by several tens of mil-
liseconds. Moreover, while form feature primitives can be conjoined at 
nonconscious levels establish representations of vertices, corners, etc. 
or the entire shape of an object, the conjunction of form and surfaces 
attributes appears to occur only at the conscious level of processing. 
These ideas furthermore explain a good portion of extant psychophysi-
cal findings regarding spatiotemporal aspects of object vision and sug-
gest future directions of psychophysical and neuroscientific research 
on object vision.   
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FootNotes
1 At longer SOAs, those above 40 ms, phenomenal reports of ob-
servers included a total or partial suppression of the target’s contours 
correlated with total or partial suppression of the surface contrast. 
However, despite not seeing the contours of the target, they were often 
able to infer the location of the contour features due to contour-feature 
transposition from the target to the mask (Herzog & Koch, 2001). 
Since apparent motion is the medium or carrier of feature transposi-
tion  (Breitmeyer,  Herzog,  &  Öğmen,  2008)  and  since  particularly 
these SOAs yield strong sensations of outward apparent motion from 
the target to the mask, one would expect to be able to infer features of 
the masked target contours (e.g, its contour cutoffs) by how they were 
transposed to the mask. This may explain why, at the SOAs of 40 ms 
and longer, the normalized visibility on target contour discrimination 
was slightly higher than that of target contrast.  
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